A credit associate extending a loan to an obligor suspects that the obligor may change his behavior after the loan has been originated. The obligor in this case may use the loan proceeds for purposes not sanctioned by the lender, thereby increasing the risk of default. Hence, the credit associate must estimate the probability of default based on the assumptions about the applicability of the following tendency to this lending situation:

A credit associate extending a loan to an obligor suspects that the obligor may change his behavior after the loan has been originated. The obligor in this case may use the loan proceeds for purposes not sanctioned by the lender, thereby increasing the risk of default. Hence, the credit associate must estimate the probability of default based on the assumptions about the applicability of the following tendency to this lending situation:
A . Speculation
B . Short bias
C . Moral hazard
D . Adverse selection

Answer: C

Explanation:

Moral hazard occurs when one party in a contractual relationship can take risks because the consequences of those risks will be borne by another party. In this scenario, the credit associate is concerned that the obligor might use the loan proceeds for purposes not sanctioned by the lender, thereby increasing the risk of default. This situation is a classic example of moral hazard, where the obligor’s behavior after receiving the loan could change in a way that increases the lender’s risk without the lender having control over those actions.

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